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What! Another Minimum Wage Study?
ABSTRACT
The Minimum Wage Study Commission was established in 1977 to aid
Congress in investigating the effects and possible consequences of two
proposed changes in the minimum wage law: indexing the wage to inflation
and providing for a youth differential. This paper seeks to determine
to what extent the Minimum Wage Study Commission's work has been helpful
in policy debate, and compares the Commission's findings with those of
the more conservative American Enterprise Institute. The paper also examines
whether the Commission's final product was worth three years of study
and $17 million.
Our overall finding is that the Commission's report appears to
have had little or no policy impact. The research did little to expand
upon similar studies done prior to 1977, and cannot be said to be worth
three years and $17 million. However, policy—makers still regard the
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11The minirriniwagehas been around for decades. It is always nice
tohave study corrtnissions, but we have commissions running out
of our ears in this government. We have had studies by private
organizations, by labor, by Government, by the Chamber ofComnerce.
I cannot see anything thatthis Ccrrunission is going to be able
todo thatprivategroups or labor unionscannot."Former
Rep. Robert Baurnann (R Md.).
Voteon establishing the Minim'inWageStudy Coimuission:
Deiicrats 233 yes;45 no
Republicans 68 yes; 73 no
Total 301 yes;118 no
During Congressional consideration of amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act in 1977, there was considerable uncertainty and political
division over two potentially important proposed changes in the minimum
wage law: indexing the wage to inflation, and providingfor a youth dif-
ferential. After some debate the House voted to establish a Minimum Wage
Study Cortrnission (MWSC), which it charged with investigating a dozen topics,
including the effects of increasing the minimum on inflation, employment
and unemployment; the ability of the minimm wage to ameliorate poverty;
and the economic consequences of proposals for automatic indexing of the mini-
mum wage and for setting a special sulininimum rate for young workers.
Overa three year period, an eight member Commission headed Initially
by Gerald Feder and through most of its life by former Rep. James O'Hara (D Mich.)
funded a large body of economic research on minimum wage issues, at a cost of
$17 million,. Altogether, the Commission's contracts involved over 90 researchers,
consultants and discussants (including one of us). There were also
several studies carried out by the Commission's own staff economists and two
surveys of emploeyrs conducted by government agencies.
On May 24, 1981, the Commission issued a 250 page report suninarizing
its findings and setting forth conclusions and policy recairnendations.
Sixadditionalvolumes containing research paperswerepublished later in
the year.—2—
Because the Corrinission was established by a Democratic Congress,
with Corrmissioners selected by Demjcratic cabinet officers, Republicans
consistently voiced doubts alx)ut the potential impartiality of the proposed
study.Notcoincidentally, theAmericanEnterprise Institute (AEI),a
conservative think tank, shortly thereafter initiated its own major study
ofthe rniniimirnwage.
Towhatextent has theMinimumWageStudy Cortmission' s ork been
helpfulin policy debate?Didthe researchfunded by the liberal Cc—
missionyield results different fraTithat funded by theconservativeAEI?
Overall,wastheCommission' s pnxluct rth three years of study and $17
million? Whatcanbe learned fran the Commission experienceaboutthe value
of study corrinissions to those outside the research camunity?
To answerthesequestions we have reviewed the sevenvolumeReport
of the MiniimxnWageStudy Coninission, andaseries of other AEIstudieson
the minimum;andhave interviewedmembers and staffof the House and Senate
LaborConinitteeswhich have jurisdiction over the Fair LaborStandards Act,
and thus tend to be the nst importantCongressionalconsumersofresearch
on the minimumwage.
The Commission research
Table 1 presents in capsule form oursurrinary ofthe research by
the MWSC and the AEIorganizedaccording to the following topics: daio—
graphic profile of minimumwagevrkers and compliance with the Fair Labor
StandardsAct;overallemplOyment effécta;employment effectson youthand
ofthe youth sutniinimum;incomedistribution; macroeconanic effects on real
wages and inflation; nonwage job effects.
Because the Comnission did not undertakestudiesof foreign ex-
periences, the political issues involved in support of the minimum wage,
or the pathological effects of teenage unemploymentoncrime, we haveTABLE 1: Studies: Mininnnn Wage Study Comnission
vs. American EriterpriseJnstitUte
1. Deiwxjraphic Profiles and Compliance
ninuaTi WStjy_Cormu ssion
Author
48% of all rninirrum wage workers are
16—24 years old, 37% are women 25years
arid over, relatively large proportions
of minimum wage workers in groupe of:
teenagers 16—17 (62) ,18—19(33%),
workers over 65 (39%) ,vorron(185)
blacks (l8,), students (56%),part—
time workers (36¼), and poverty
families (43%); only 9i of adults
20—64.
Sellekaerts & Welch
In 1973—1930, found noncompliance con-
sistently higher in los-wage sectors, and
in the South, arcnq females, nonwhites and
teeriagers than in corn lenenary groups.
In 1979 violation survey ncn—Souths rate
exceeds South's; overtime violations nost
prevalent. In 1978 CPS sample, overtime




1980 survey of low—wa:je estab-
lishments finds almost half of
near—minimum wage workers under
20, the majority white though
higher proportion of nonwhite
workers in low—wage wrk than




overtime pay provisio:.r; overtime
pay yields greater LeIits to
middle & upper incorrv f:&milies
than to lower income 63rd lies; in-
creases in overtime di iferential
will create modest nuzi:cr of jobs.
Arnarican Enterprise_institute
Kneisser
Using CPS, finds over 60% of all las—wage
workers are female; under 40% are teenagers,
30% are in families below the poverty level,
tendency to live in the South of Great
Plains regions.
Fleishor
D.O.L. retail trade surveys in 1962, 1965—
66shows over 90% compliance for U.S.,
lowerratesin South, from 71% in 1962 to
87% in 1966 (in eligible workers covered).
Bell
öof levi—wage worket are not
household heads; concentration
in families above the poverty level.
EhrenbergSchumann
Same basic conclusions as Ehrenberg
andSchumannabove.
2. flnploymont Effects——In General
Ahow&Ki llingsworth
Underan ad hoc nridel a 2% increase leads
to a .2 to 2.4% drop in teenage soploy-
mont, a .2% rise to a .8% drop foradults.
Undera structural model, a 2%increase
leads to a .5 to 1% drop for teenagers,
anegligible drop for adults.
Surveyof low—wage sector effects finds




results as to intarsLate dis-
tribution of sales or employment
inwholesale & retail trade.
Hcckman& Sedlockek
UsingSouth Carolina worker data, a
20%minimum wageincreasemakes over




labor-forcep.articixmt:ion 01 young adult
Iceulcaarid rules over £5, significantly
decreases labor particistti.on for young
males, all with relatively email
elasticities.
Knu:n
Significant disrmolo'rset ctfccts all
localitieson lowest—skill workers as they
arereplared by medium—skilled, new labor
marketentrants.
Fleishnr
imiretail trade in th 1960s, given a ]ahor
('05t nf5, ]uts i:-3 5%;
I —o of wir- in ci
utoreryrltivo to rr•:t. .1 ryfl. trade.
For senu-onal eatton fans workers in
late1960s, 63% of large drops in n—
ployrncintattrituted to extended mini-
mum wage coverage.
Gardner
Forfarmworkers,a rise of 5% in
mranhourlywage leacsto a minimum
5%reduction in employment.
rdon
No significant effects on private
household workereJTp)oyment.
nurn_Wage tid Corruniss ion—4—
TABbE1(cont.)
3.Fnp1oyment Effects for Youths aed Youth SuhniniJTLU
MininurnWarje_SudyComrassOfl
yer & WI so
Without iiniuum wage, chplovnicnt of
non-student young men ould be up 6% at
least, av'raga youth wage lcT%'er with th€
mininiuo.
o'n, irojKohen
Survey of youth eoployrrent studiesshows
reasOnaiiy consistent tirr-ser1eE results
that 10% minlicum wage increase causes a
1 to 3% reduction in inpiovccut for 16—19
year aids, less consistency for 20—24
year aids & subgroups; their runs show a
.5 to 1.5% drop.
FIanrmesh
In private runfarm sector, a 1.0% mininuan
wage ircrease leads to a 1.2% drop overall;
higher in rranufactiring, lowei in services
aed retail trade. In private nonfaxm sec-
tor, a 10% minimum wage increase leads to
a 1.2% drou overall; higher a ra-inufac—
turing, lower in services ard retail trade.
Estiiratas that a 25% youth differential
u1d ircrease eaplocsnt by ahout. 3%.
Cunningham
For whites, €nip]ocnt isreduced,part—
thee work discouraged, and school atten-
dance reduced,non-robust results for
blacks.
Al-Salam, Quester & Welch
)fxparisionof coverageof miarnuts ges
has reduced proportion employed by 0.4
ardcreated a gap between black and white
msle teennjers of roughly 0.04 as ''eli;
cohortsize is important determinant of
proportionemployed.
latti1a
For 14-19 year olds,significant results
(flincreasein schcxlenrollments, roughly (11to rnnitU'1eofdecreaseinnon—
student latar force.
Cetternan
Study of 13-19 year old rraios gives in—
significant results for dinnaployment,
c￿>:copt for significant in rota] 1trade
($.25 increase leads to 25% drop in black
csolo'.-ront, 16% in white) ; inter—industry
shifts occur, with high—skilled teens;
employment chances improved.
Brown
Size of effects of youth differential
on teenage and especially adult em-
ployment uncertain; proaleos vi th res—
tricted differential.
Pet terejill
Eiimiratirtg minimum for youths would
increaseemployment eirongyouth,
indeterminate imeact en non-youth
low-wage workers.
Freeman, Gray, Ichnio:ski
Student submininum has led to increase
in student person ho'irs rked byper-
haps1.7% at a cost of cerhaps 1% of
employment of full-time non-student
workers.
Pagan
Legafreinirrurn raises wages in youth
intensive sectors; some evidence that
rnaner programs have raised employ-
ment, that minimum reduces employment
for some teenage groups.
Fleishiir
InretTl trade, significant negative
impact on employment for young males,
inconclusiveresults for females.
Cotterill
Rc'view suggests significant problems
ofexclusion of other low age groups
by differentialto youth1
especiallyin retail &service areas.
4. income Distribution
!'L
phrmun,Tadrn & Sick]c 3onnon & Browning
In cn'vk u;r.o: o;ti,ons fail ir. below theTheari3 simulations, found even di s— poverty lln, uorLulrdyecrltsby rare;tnhLion of benefits over all inca' a females a:-r'cm to do sliqhtl better thanlevels n.l discmplcrnrr.t effects m1]cs; varied results for O7 ago—sex 1c.vcrirr thebenefits,cjvrsv-allv snail
eaocx)iimgcjrcg s. distributioril effects, within inca-a
1fi(x-Oity increaser (00 of Icy?—







On Uo o.d.y 'viiil:,:i..i. ''r,'
iner':,cminLr ibnon.F,u'n ... in'.ion
crcs-s increma 1'"- - '.tie
W,r,"rS.
1ticr & i.-uy
Cr'S '-st', 20% iy.rras n 'iri—
'OiJC (n.' ':e5 f31tC 101 I1'OI''O





Using MIS, found nal1 wage gains forlow-
wageadult fenales, offsetby cmplosent








1% niimma wage increase leads to a .3
to l.3 of xrk force forced out of labor
market; average wage rise of 1 to 2%.
Boschnn & Grossman
Increases in minimum wv;e depress current
nployiient in some industries, no effect
on acjgregete arplo1a2nt or average wage
rate; effect of indosation urortain.
Sel.iekaerts
10%minirrrn;aoe increase causes a rise of.05%in unempioyent rate & .76%
risein average wages; initial impact of
indexajLionurer thin: is tar effect bene- ficial(e.g. increasedefficiency).
Farber
10% change in minimum leads to less
than.5%change in union wage.
Cox & Gaxaca
10% rise leads to a .15 rise in
aggregate real wage bill; an increase
in high-wage enlooient, decrease in
low-wage & overall.
Wolff & Nadiri
Raisingminimum wage -as cositive
effect on output the: tftcriedistri-
bution,negativeon cmt-h-yment, and




Direct effect on inflation negligible,
even ifminimumwage is indexed.
6.t'on-Wage JobEffects (On—the—Job Training, etc.)
Minimtrn Wage Studyççsmrnission
Lazear & Miller
UsingNES,to obvious retardation effects of
theniiniiiuruwage on wage growth.
Amer can EnEprise Institute
Fleisher
UsingNES,whilewagerates are higher in
covered than noncovered sectors, adding
the wageadvantage of working to repor ted
wages causeswages inuncovered sector




neutral effccts on lalor participation,
slight-.effects on priors, and a positvo
or neutral effect on quit rates.
Hashimato
Using MIS, some reduction in On-
the-job Training (OJT) (2.5%) found








Papersreviewed are contained either in Volumesh—Vuof the
of f-br'_Minimum Naqe Stedv Comninsion(MNSC),published in July, 1981; in the ?aricanEnterpriseInstitute's (AEI) conference volume, The Economics of alMiim (ed. Siren ottenborg, published 1981); P-'dt :iinim-ac,by Enald Pnrnons;Miniinumtcsqe R11ationinretailTj-H',byEel ton Fleisher; :inimlesun_ the-,joTinr.bi ri Fhsu.roiir'cn'- 1rir—e Br'rrits
andlbrkinq Con-Itt-ions,by alte- Wc'sscls; ar-IThe I:a:-cLof the 1in rim
t-'aclConEcgiorul_Iaberrkebs, hy RonaldKruor. Studiosare referred
to byauthar.MIS refers to the National Longitudinal Survey ("Parries
Survey") funded by theDcpaatment of Labor.—6—
cznittedthe AEI studies on those subjects fran the table.
Our reading of the results of the research is that there is no
discernible liberal MWSC or conservative AEl bias to the studies: the
professional economists selected by the two groups produced results generally
consistent with each other and with previous firdings on the minimum. If
one did not know which study had been funded by which group, one could not
guess fran the results. In several cases the MWSC work yielded results
nore unfavorable to the minimum wage than the AEI work, in other cases,
the reverse is true. Persons predisposed against the minimum can read the
MWSC research studies and the staff stuimary of the research without worrying
aboutdistortions due topolitical bias by the MWSC; conversely,persons predisposed
for the minimum canreadthe AEI-sponsored research without worrying about
distortionsdue to politicalbias by the AEI.
Onthe issue of the diserrplonent effects of the minimum, the
vast bulk of the research studies funded by the two groups show mDdest/
rioderate impacts consistent with the professional consensus. With respect
to the youth subiiinimuin, which tends to be favored by conservatives, the
AEI studynotedimportant administrative problswhile the MWSC studies
canhardly be termed as negative. On theissue of inflation the conclusion of
both sets of studies was that the minimum does not have sizeable impacts on
inflation. Turning to income distribution effects of the minimum, a similar
conclusion seems warranted, with both MWSC aid AEI showing only slight increases
or decreases in inequality as a result of the minimum.
Overall, we find that the MWSC andAEI studiesfall well within
the general findings of the literature thattheminimum wage hasonlynodest
effects on the economyasa whole. On net, neither the MWSC nor the AEl
studiesyielded results that willraise the eyebrows of the research can—
rriunity.—7—
The Coimiission reconuriendatjons
Volume I of the Coirmission report gives the recaimendations of the
corrrnission. While the central chapters of the final report deal with the
effects on employment, inflation, and poverty, nearly a third of the dis—
cussion--and nst of the specific policy reoiimiendations—-concern relatively
narrow issues of exemptions for particular industries and enforcement
matters. Only two of the Corrumission' s recoirinendations address major policy
questions. By a vote of 6 to 1 with one present, the Corrinission rejected
the youth differential; by a vote of 5 to 2 with one not voting it advocated
automatic indexing of the minimum wage to adjust for inflation. By a vote
of 5 to 1, with one voting present, and one not voting, the Commission
voted down a proposal to permit local experimentation with a lower minimum
for youth. With respect to other policy issues, the Commission called for
restrictions in the current differential wage for full-time students;
increases in the salary test for exempting certain professionals from over-
time requirents; and the repeal of a large number of narrowly-drawn ex-
emptions to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Both the positions and the general tone of the report express favorable
attitudes toward the minimum wage, prompting an angry dissent from one
member of the Commission. Commissioner S. Warne Robinson attacked the final
report as blatantly biased toward labor unions and "an undistinguished piece
of work" that did not adequately use the research findings. Indeed, the
latter criticism seems valid; the conclusions do indeed seem unconnected
to the research results. Rarely, if at all are specific research studies
referenced in the Commission recorrrnendations: for instance, the recorrmnendation
for restricting the current student suhminimum has ro link to the NWSC
funded research on the operation of the subtninimumn.
In short, the Carinission caine in with a final report to which one
Commissioner lodged serious objections, from which one often voted just—8--
present, and another often did not vote, and which did not appear to rely
heavily on fundedresearch.
Policy—makers' response to the report
The MWSC was instituted by a Dancratic Congress under a Dro—
cratic administration; in the three intervening years, the political climate
changed, putting Republicans in control of the White House and. Senate. These
changes are important in understanding the reaction to the Coiriruissioner's
report.
When the MWSC final report and reccxnriendations were released on
May 24, 1981, they did not attract nuch attention. Press coverage was
minimal, consisting of routine treatment by the wire services and a few
articles in specialized publications like the Daily Labor Report (Bureau
of National Affairs). There were no briefings on the findings for press
or Capitol Hill, presumably because of the obvious absence of political
interest in minimuii wages at the time by a Congress prccupied with the
tax and budget proposals of the Reagan Administration.
Anticipating that rrost congressional offices ould simply file the
report away until legislative action appeared irore imminent, we interviewed
tkose with the strongest reason to follow the work of the Caiimission:
rners and staff of the Senate and House Labor Corrinittees. The Corrinittee
members and staff we interviewed generally knew the report existed but were
far from equally knowledgeable about its contents. Some committee staff
had read or skimmed the material; others planned to look it over during a
slow week. Corrinittee members typically had neither read nor glanced at nor
seen a staff sirmary of the Cormuission's wrk. Rep. Millicent Fenwick
(R, N.J.) said that she hadn't heard of the Carinission or its prodit
"until this minute". In only a few of the interviews did the members indicate
much awareness of specific findings or recorrinendations.
Given the absence of the rninixrnim wage from this year 'slegislative—9—
agenda, the "back burner" treatrrent of the report by Congress does rot
precludegreater attention to the work in the future. When sane action on
the minimum wage is anticipated, the Lalx)r Carmittees will start the
hearings process. Dccratic aides, at least, say the Corrrnission's studies
will be useful as backgrourx:1 and that individual researchers may be sought
out as withesses.
Anong those familiar with the Corrrnission Report, evaluations split
along partisan lines. Republicans found it biased--an inevitability given
the make-up of the Commission. "It just gave a recitation of organized
labor' s demands on the minimum wage," said Sen. Orrin Hatch (R, Utah),
Chairman of the Senate Labor Caumittee. Republicans also agreed with
Pobinson' s indictment that the Camiission' s conclusions igrored the research
findings. Whilethe report and its recorrinendations could be easily dis-
missed, some suggested the underlying studies might still be worth looking
at. Deriocrats conceded the Conmission's slant towardlaborbut strongly
defendedthe professional quality of the investigation. "The research
isn' t tainted.., or even partisan," said an aide to the House Education
and Labor Ccttmittee. "Most of the academics doing the studies were rela-
tively conservative".
During the intex'iiis, staff and members tended to interpret various
Corrrnission findings according to their predispositions on the issues. Tlose
opposed to a sulininimum wage for youth, for example, considered the reported
effects on enployment small and emphasized the possibility that young workers
would be substituted for low-paid adults--a result the Commission said could
not be ruled out. Supporters of a suhnininiurn viewed the emplonent effects
as appreciable and took note of the lack o evidence on the issue of sub—
sitution. "I favor a youth suhninimurn, but if a valid study shows sig-
nificant firing of adults I could change my mind," said Rep. John Erlenborn
(R, Ill.). Rep. Paul Sirron (D, Ill.), noting that an earlier study had
caused him to change positions and support a sulininimurn, said he'd be—10—
open-minded about anything new from the ConTnission. "But we do tend to
go through these things to look for information that agrees with our po-
sitions and buttresses ourprejudices,"he said.
Theexistence of the Minirruirn Wage Study Cairiission may have in-
fluenced the policies of the Reagan Administration on the question of the
youthdifferential, at least indirectly. Surprising many Republican sup-
porters of the suhninimum, the Administration did not take a position on
the issue in the spring of 1981: Secretary of Labor Paynond J. Donovan
said that the department was waiting to see the Sti1y Cournission's report
before making reccimnendations on the suthdnimum.
It is possible, however, thatthereference to the report was just
a convenient excuse. Business interest in the idea of a suthilnimurnhad
begunto wane. A fight over establishing a suthiinimum for young workers
or any other group would open the Fair Labor Standards Act to all kinds of
amendments, inclining another series of increases in the minimumwage.
In addition, some pivotal groups, like the fast-food industry, hadapparently
expresseddoubts about the feasibility of a suhninimum, since it would
violate the principle of equal pay for equal work.
On the other hand, the idea had some natural appeal to a Repub-
lican Administration. It provided an "incentive" to employers witbout
costing the government any ironey. Perhaps if the Corrrnission's research had
found thatloweringthe minimumproduced largenumbers of new jobs for
youth, the Administration might have decided to corrinititself.
Evaluation
Overall, the Cormiission's report appears to have had little or no
policy impact. while in a different political climate, the recomnerxlation
for indexing the minimum wage might have been given serious Congressional
attention, the reception of the report suggests it would have been taken
as a partisan document under any circumstances.—11—
Peturning toouroriginal question, was the Corrimission's product
vrththree years of study and $17 million?
Our answer is no.
To begin with, the research did not generateanythingstrikingly
new in the minimum wage literature. On rrost questions, the findings corro-
borate those of similar studies done prior to 1977. If, instead of em-
barking on a broad research plan that duplicated a lot of existing s'xrk,
the Cc*rtission had surveyed the literature and identified the gaps and then
initiated a limited number of studies it might have perfonned a noreuseful
function. For a fraction of the cost, it could then have funded a few
projts that would clearly have added to the knowledge base. In par-
ticular, on the issue of the youth sulxniniiium, much might have been learned
froma three yearexperimentof the measure in several cities.
Lessons on the value of study coninissions
"I'm against these studies. No one ever looks at them—not even
the reconTnendations."Rep.Fenwick (R, N.J.).
Does ourconclusionabout the Minimum Wage Study Conmission Report
imply that such corrmissions invariably have little impact on policy-makers?
Ouranswer and that ofirost of the Members and staffweinter-
viewed isno.
Asa counterexample, several of those we interviewedreferredto
the National Corrmission on State Workmen's Canpensation Laws (set up in
1971) as a comnission whose report hadasignificant impact. Chaired by
Johr Burton,the Carimission was given high marks forprofessionalin;
fordeveloping nodel legislation that was useful to statewo' compen-
sation programs, and for achieving agrerent on key policy reconinendations.
"When you have unanimity, it's a sign that a study has ledthem(the Corn—
missioners)someplace," a Senate aide explained. Another, producinghis
dog-earedcopy, said he still referredtothe nearly ten-year-old report
whena workers'compensation issue arose.—12--
Mcre generally, members and staff expressed preferences for narrowly-
focused reports with clear policy orientations. "1 like to see specific
recortinendations--not just a lot of infornation," said Rep. SilTon. Reports
that analyze the effectiveness of programs are especially useful. While
positive evaluations are obviously good airinuruition in a debate, aides ex-
plained, even negative findings can help members legislate changes in programs
that avoid the pitfalls. Aides also indicated interest in empirical work,
as long as it wasn't too technical. "We see a lot of studies by the General
Accounting Office or by various interest groups that just aren't very
solid," said one. "They're based on a few cases, and have no statistical
validity."
Tohave a policy impact, in our judgment, a study oortrnission must
have:
involvement by recognized experts and balancing of idlogical
interests, to minimize doubts about the credibility of the in—
vestigation;
strong policy orientation in final reports with results based
on the research studies funded by the cormiission;
consensus, if not unanimity, in conclusions.
As our comparison of MWSC and PEI funded research on the mini-
mum wage indicates, initial conservative concerns about 'bias' in the
research funded by MWSC proved wrong. While not exciting, the MWSC research
generally produced credible estimates of the effects of the minirmxrn wage
on the econany. Lack of connection between the research findings and the
Commission recommendations, lack of unanimity in the Commission recormndations,
and the changed political climate,however,make this a case in which the
research results have had little impact on policy and, in our view, are
unlikely to have much impact on policy in the future.